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A B S T R A C T
The passwords for authenticating users are susceptible to shoulder-surfing attacks in which
attackers learn users’ passwords through direct observations without any technical support.
A straightforward solution to defend against such attacks is to change passwords periodi-
cally or even constantly, making the previously observed passwords useless. However, this
may lead to a situation in which users run out of strong passwords they can remember, or
they are forced to choose passwords that are weak, correlated, or difficult to memorize. To
achieve both security and usability in user authentication, we propose EvoPass, the first evolv-
able graphical password authentication system. EvoPass transforms a set of user-selected pass
images to pass sketches as user credentials. Users are required to identify their pass sketches
from a set of challenge images for user authentication. Particularly, EvoPass improves pass-
word strength gradually over time through continually degrading pass sketches without
annoying users to reselect pass images. The evolving feature makes it difficult for observa-
tional adversaries to identify the pass sketches, even though part of pass sketches may have
been exposed to adversaries previously.We introduce two metrics, Information Retention Rate
(IRR) and Password Diversity Score (PDS) to guide the process of generating pass sketches and
a set of challenge images. Our experimental analysis reveals that applying reasonable IRR and
PDS in EvoPass can remarkably improve the resistance to shoulder-surfing attacks without
negatively affecting user experience.We also implement a prototype of EvoPass on Android
platform with reasonable IRR and PDS applied. Our experimental results on the prototype
further demonstrate that EvoPass could work efficiently and achieve a desired usability.
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Password-based user authentication is the most common au-
thenticationmethod used onmobile devices. In password-based
user authentication, a user provides an alphanumerical or
graphical password on a user interface as the user’s creden-
tial. However, the password entry process is vulnerable to
shoulder-surfing attacks, in which a password entered on a user
interface is observed by a nearby adversary without any
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technical record devices, such as a hidden-camera. Although
the abilities of a shoulder-surfing attacker are restricted to those
of a human, since people are prone to carry and use mobile
devices everyday and everywhere, even in crowded places, it
is important to address such attacks so as to protect mobile
users’s passwords.
Some authentication systems require or encourage users
to choose strong passwords, such as non-dictionary pass-
words, to increase the difficulty for shoulder-surfing attacker
to remember such passwords. However, it also inevitably in-
creases the burden on users for remembering such passwords.
Even worse, when users enter such passwords, it is about 40
percent slower than dictionary words (Thomas et al., 2005),
making the password entry process more vulnerable to
shoulder-surfing attacks. Another widespread measure to miti-
gate the risk of shoulder-surfing attacks is to change the
password periodically or continually, thusmaking revealed pass-
words useless for shoulder-surfing attackers. Unfortunately, such
practice may still result in poor user experience and even make
users fail in authentication, since eventually it forces users to
memorize passwords that they can hardly remember. There-
fore, it remains a challenge to mitigate shoulder-surfing attacks
and achieve good usability at the same time for password-
based user authentication on mobile devices.
In this work, we propose EvoPass, an evolvable graphical
password-based authentication mechanism onmobile devices.
EvoPass improves the resistance to shoulder-surfing attacks
gradually over time without requiring users to replace their
passwords. Users of EvoPass are required to identify pass
sketches from a challenge set of images that contains pass
sketches and decoy sketches. The pass sketches are trans-
formed from pass images selected by users from their private
images. Each pass sketch is generated by processing edge ex-
traction on the original pass image, reserving only a subset of
edges and basic outlines. Using pass sketches instead of pass
images as user credentials makes it difficult for a shoulder-
surfing attacker tomemorize and identify pass sketches without
any prior knowledge of the original pass images, while users
who are familiar with their pass images can still easily iden-
tify the pass sketches.
When used, EvoPass evolves pass sketches tomore shoulder-
surfing resilient versions through periodically or continually
reducing the recognizable information contained in each pass
sketch. In this way, legitimate users could still identify the
evolved pass sketches based on the visual memory of previ-
ous pass sketches in successive authentication practices.
Meanwhile, the evolved pass sketches increase the difficulty
for a shoulder-surfing attacker to identify them, especially in
the presence of other confusing decoy sketches. To our best
knowledge, this is the first work that introduces the time-
evolving feature in graphical passwords for gradually improving
the resistance to shoulder-surfing attacks without requiring
users to change passwords.
To balance between security and usability of EvoPass, it is
important to ensure that the recognizable information in each
pass sketch should be as little as possible against the shoulder-
surfing attacks and enough for users to easily identify the pass
sketches. For such purpose, we introduce Information Reten-
tion Rate (IRR) as a metric to evaluate the reservation rate of
information entropy between a pass sketch and its original pass
image and thus determine the appropriate edge extraction level
for each pass image. Meanwhile, we further add decoy sketches
in the challenge set to confuse the adversaries in shoulder-
surfing attacks. To guide the selection of decoy sketches, we
introduce Password Diversity Score (PDS), a metric for evalu-
ating the statistical characteristics of the challenge set.
Our experimental results show that, with the help of IRR
and PDS, EvoPass can achieve better resistance to shoulder-
surfing attackers than other graphical password-based
authentication systems. To further explore the usability and
efficiency of EvoPass, we implement a prototype on Android
platform and demonstrate that users can quickly become skilled
at using EvoPass and pass user authentication within an ac-
ceptable period time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes the related work. Section 3 introduces the preliminaries.
Section 4 presents the design of EvoPass. Section 5 analyzes
the security of EvoPass. Section 6 presents a prototype of
EvoPass on Android platform and evaluates its usability and
efficiency. Section 7 concludes this paper.
2. Related work
2.1. Human visual ability
The recognition of visual objects has been studied rigorously
for decades (Denning et al., 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2003e). EvoPass
relies on human ability of recognizing images. Humans have ex-
traordinary ability to recognize degraded images especially when
they gain the knowledge of the original images. Biederman (1987)
proposed a theory of human image understanding, which is
named as Recognition-by-Components.This theory claims that
if an arrangement of two or three generalized-cone compo-
nents can be recovered from the input, objects can be quickly
recognized evenwhen they are occluded, novel, rotated in depth,
or extensively degraded. Denning et al. (2003d) explored im-
plicit memory for painless password recovery, and their results
suggest that implicit memory can be potentially used for low-
cognitive-overhead, high-stability, and knowledge-based
authentication.
2.2. Graphical passwords and attacks
Graphical password systems (e.g. Angeli et al., 2005; Hong et al.,
2004; Suo et al., 2005; Wiedenbeck et al., 2005) gain more at-
tention recently as a promising alternative of text-based
password systems in both academia and industry. Most graphi-
cal password mechanisms are based on recognizing system-
provided images, such as faces (Passfaces corporation, 2001),
identifying user uploaded images (Hayashi et al., 2008; Pering
et al., 2003; Takada et al., 2006), recognizing the category of pass
images (Khot et al., 2011), or recalling a sequence of actions,
such as clicking (Chiasson, 2008; Chiasson et al., 2009a, 2009b;
Dirik et al., 2007) and drawing (Dunphy and Yan, 2007).Various
graphical password authentication systems have also been sup-
ported in industry. For example, the graphical identification and
authentication (GINA) system is a component of Windows 7,
Windows Server 2008,Windows Server 2008 R2, andWindows
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Vista,which provides secure authentication and interactive login
services (Microsoft, 2013). Gao et al. (2013) studied user choices
in Windows 8 graphical password scheme and analyzed the
hot-spots caused by user choices.
Among the graphical password systems that are used in
mobile environment (e.g. Hayashi et al., 2008; Khan et al., 2011),
that of Hayashi et al. (2008) is the most related work to ours.
Hayashi et al. (2008) proposed a graphical password system
named Use Your Illusion.This system, just like EvoPass, relies
on human ability to recognize a degraded version of a previ-
ously seen image. Use Your Illusion utilizes an image process
filter to eliminate most details in an image, while preserving
some features such as color and rough shapes. However, Use
Your Illusion does not solve the following problems. First, it
allows users to upload their own images as pass images without
checking the quality of these images, which may make these
pass images vulnerable to some sophisticated adversaries. For
example, if all the pass images are very similar, the pass images
may attract the adversaries’ attention and thus be selected for
password guess attacks.Therefore, it is better to provide a guide-
line or validation process for choosing the pass images. Second,
it applies a fixed distortion parameter for processing all pass
images; however, since the entropy of a pass image is usually
different from other pass images, applying a fixed distortion
parameter for all pass images may cause some pass images
containing little recognizable information, which makes such
pass images hard to identify. Third, for each pass image, the
distortion algorithm and parameters remain the same for all
authentication practices, thus the challenge set of images
remains the same. Its resistance to shoulder-surfing attacks
can only be improved by requiring users to re-select pass
images. Finally, the average login time (which is over 10 seconds)
is not acceptable for most people to authenticate themselves
on mobile devices.
Table 1 compares the features of different popular
recognition-based password systems with EvoPass. We have
the following observations from the comparison. First, most
of the previous graphical password systems choose decoy
images from system images, and in some cases, even pass
images are chosen by the system from system images, rather
than from users’ owned images. In this way, it is difficult for
users to remember pass images; it also enables an attacker who
has captured a large number of decoy images to guess users’
pass images (more details are given in Section 5.3). Some pre-
vious graphical systems are resilient to shoulder-surfing attacks.
Like EvoPass, they do not require users to select original pass
images during authentication processes. For example,
DynaHand (Renaud and Olsen, 2007) requires a user to recog-
nize an image in which a random sequence of numbers is
displayed in the user’s handwritten numerals rather than an
image that contains the user’s PIN.Tetrad (Renaud andMaguire,
2009) requires a user to align his/her pass images either hori-
zontally, vertically or diagonally.Although these systems provide
resistance to shoulder-surfing attacks, none of them improve
password strength gradually over time without requiring users
to update their passwords.
3. Preliminaries
3.1. Terminology
We will use the following security terminology in this paper:
Pass image – A pass image is an image chosen by a user
from a set of private images and registered to EvoPass.
Decoy image – A decoy image is an image chosen by EvoPass
from a set of images in system database according to the
statistical characteristics of pass images.
Sketch – A sketch is a binary image generated by process-
ing an image with a specific edge detection algorithm.
Pass sketch – A pass sketch is a binary image generated by
processing a pass image with a specific edge detection
algorithm.
Decoy sketch – A decoy sketch is a binary image gener-
ated by processing a decoy image with a specific edge
detection algorithm.
Challenge set – A challenge set is a set of binary images,
which is composed of all pass sketches and some decoy
sketches.
Password Diversity Score (PDS) – PDS is a metric that is cal-
culated based on the distance between each pair of two
images in a set of images and used to guide the selection
of decoy images.
Information Retention Rate (IRR) – IRR is a metric that is cal-
culated between a sketch and its original image and used
Table 1 – A comparison between EvoPass and previous recognition-based graphical password schemes on various key
features.
Sys. Key src. Decoy src. User picks Filtering RSSA1 RSEA2 Time-evolving
VIP3 (Angeli et al., 2005) Stock Stock No Manual No Yes No
Awase (Takada et al., 2006) User Stock Yes None No Yes No
UYI (Hayashi et al., 2008) User Stock Yes None Yes No No
Pering (Pering et al., 2003) User Peers Yes Manual No No No
Déjà vu (Dhamija and Perrig, 2000) Fractals Fractals Yes Manual No Yes No
Passfaces (Passfaces corporation, 2001) Stock Stock No Manual No Yes No
GridMap (Balen and Wang, 2014) Stock Stock Yes None Yes No No
DynaHand (Renaud and Olsen, 2007) Stock Stock No Automatic Yes No No
Tetrad (Renaud and Maguire, 2009) Stock Stock No None Yes Yes No
EvoPass User User Yes Automatic Yes Yes Yes
1
RSSA: Resilient to Shoulder-Surfing Attacks.
2
RSEA: Resilient to Social Engineer Attacks.
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to evaluate the recognizable information remained in the
sketch.
Roll-back – Roll-back is a set of operations used to gener-
ate a new version of a challenge set. Each pass sketch in
this new version contains more recognizable information
than in the current version.
3.2. Threat model
In the authentication process, EvoPass presents a challenge set
that contains both decoy sketches and pass sketches on a user
interface, and a user is required to choose all pass sketches
to pass the authentication. We use a threat model in which
an adversary who is a shoulder-surfing attacker. A shoulder-
surfing attacker intends to capture a legitimate user’s pass
sketches through observing the user’s selection of pass sketches
without any technical recording device. The capability of the
shoulder-surfing attacker is restrained to a human, relying on
only his/her memory and manual tools such as pencil and pen
(Roth et al., 2004).
Out of the scope of this paper is the technology-based re-
cording attacker who can enhance vision using binoculars or
a low power telescope, record a login process using video
cameras, video mobile phones, keystroke logging software, or
malicious software, and capture user’s actions using remote
electro-magnetic sensors (Wiedenbeck et al., 2006). It remains
a future work to evaluate EvoPass against this kind of attackers.
In addition to shoulder-surfing abilities, the adversary con-
sidered in our threat model may have a physical access to a
user’s device and analyze the oil residues left by a user on the
user interface. The adversary can mount exhaustive pass-
word guessing attacks, dictionary attacks and social engineering
attacks to obtain a user’s pass images.
4. EvoPass
4.1. Overview
EvoPass is a graphical password authentication system on
mobile devices. EvoPass authenticates users by requiring them
to recognize all pass sketches in a challenge set. These pass
sketches are transformed from the pass images uploaded by
the user at registration. As time goes by, EvoPass evolves pass
sketches to more shoulder-surfing resilient versions.
Fig. 1 illustrates an instance of EvoPass.A user uploads some
of his/her private images as pass images (shown in Fig. 1a).
In order to conceal such pass images in a challenge set, EvoPass
chooses some decoy images and then transforms all the pass
images and decoy images to sketches. After that, the chal-
lenge set is presented to the user for authentication, as shown
in Fig. 1b, in which the pass sketches are highlighted in red
frames. Over time, EvoPass further evolves the pass sketches
by obscuring their outlines and reducing their edge informa-
tion as shown in Fig. 1c.
EvoPass is a client–server system. However, a client only
communicates with the server for registering the pass images.
Other operations (e.g., user authentication, evolving pass
sketches, roll-back) are just performed locally to reduce the
burden on the network. EvoPass includes four functional sub-
systems: Registration, Authentication, Time-evolving and Roll-back.
4.1.1. Registration
The following steps are executed at registration:
– Private images uploading: first, a user chooses some images
from his/her private images as pass images. Note that, in
different implementations, the number of pass images
should be decided based on certain security require-
ments. After the pass images are selected, the client
performs a primary security evaluation of these pass images.
If these pass images are identified insecure, i.e., any pair
of these pass images are graphically similar (which can be
identified by comparing a pair of images with perceptual
hash algorithms (Zauner, 2010)), the user is required to re-
choose pass images. Otherwise, the client sends pass images
to the server.
– Challenge set generating: Upon receiving a registration
request and pass images from a client, the server chooses
a certain number of decoy images from the system data-
base.The system database is constituted by registered pass
images of all users to defend against harvest attacks (Section
Fig. 1 – An instance of EvoPass. (a) shows the pass images uploaded by the user. (b) illustrates the sketches generated from
the images in (a) through edge extraction. The sketches in (c) are evolved versions of those in (b), in which the edge
information is further reduced. The red borders in (b) and (c) highlight the pass sketches. (For interpretation of the
references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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5.3). The server first transforms pass images and decoy
images into gray-scale images. Then the server processes
gray-scale pass images and decoy images with an edge de-
tection algorithm generating pass sketches and decoy
sketches.After that, the server sends the challenge set com-
posed of pass sketches and decoy sketches to the client. Note
that, to keep pass sketches recognizable to a user while in-
creasing the difficulty for shoulder-surfing attackers to
identify pass sketches, two metrics – Information Reten-
tion Rate (IRR) and Password Diversity Score (PDS) – are
applied in generating a challenge set. More details about
these two metrics are given in Section 4.2.
– User training: EvoPass provides a user training phase tomake
it easier for users to recognize pass sketches. In this phase,
a client presents a received challenge set to a user.The user
can practice several times in selecting his/her pass sketches
in the challenge set until he/she finds no difficulty in iden-
tifying all pass sketches. Moreover, if a user is not satisfied
with the challenge set, e.g., feeling difficult in recognizing
pass sketches, the challenging set can be refreshed through
restarting from the step of private images uploading.
4.1.2. Authentication
In authentication, EvoPass challenges a user with a chal-
lenge set presented on a user interface. A user is required to
identify all pass sketches. To prevent shoulder-surfing attack-
ers from recognizing pass sketches through remembering the
positions of pass sketches in a challenge set, all sketches in a
challenge set are displayed in a random sequence for each au-
thentication attempt.
To mitigate the risk of password guessing attacks, EvoPass
enforces a lock out policy to block a user who continuously fails
in passing the authentication several times.The allowed number
of failed authentications attempts should be specified based
on certain security requirements of EvoPass implementa-
tions. Once a user is blocked, he/she should be authenticated
by other authentication methods for unblocking. For example,
EvoPass may authenticate a user in such situation by requir-
ing him/her to provide a PIN code which is previously set by
the user for security enhancement.
4.1.3. Time-evolving
EvoPass evolves pass sketches to more shoulder-surfing resil-
ient versions through reducing the recognizable information
contained in each pass sketch.The evolving operations can be
performed periodically or constantly based on user configu-
ration. Meanwhile, EvoPass allows users to activate evolving
operations at any time as demand.There are two ways to gen-
erate an evolved version of a challenge set. One way is to
process gray-scale pass images and decoy images with an edge
detection algorithm in a higher edge detection level. Another
way is to process current version of pass sketches and decoy
sketches with an edge detection algorithm. More details about
these two ways are given in Section 4.3.
4.1.4. Roll-back
In case a user feels difficult in recognizing evolved pass
sketches, EvoPass allows a user to roll back a challenge set that
contains more information that the user can recognize in each
pass sketch and decoy sketch. The number of versions that a
user can roll back from current version should be decided based
on the trade-off between the usability and storage consump-
tion. If the system supports rolling back a relatively large
number of versions, it is more convenient for users. However,
since roll-back operations are performed locally to reduce the
burden on the network, supporting a relatively larger number
of versions requires relatively more storage space for saving
the parameters of previous versions. More details about the
roll-back mechanism are given in Section 4.4.
4.2. Metrics for generating a challenge set
To achieve both desirable usability and security, EvoPass applies
two metrics in generating a challenge set, Information Reten-
tion Rate (IRR) and Password Diversity Score (PDS).The pass images
uploaded by a user may have different information entropy.
If all pass images and decoy images are transformed to a fixed
edge detection level (e.g., processing all pass images and decoy
images with the same Canny parameter), some pass sketches
may contain enough information for attackers to recognize
them while other pass sketches are unrecognisable even by le-
gitimate users.To solve this problem, IRR is proposed to evaluate
the reservation rate of information entropy while transform-
ing an image to a sketch and determining an appropriate edge
detection level. On the other hand, if the decoy sketches in a
challenge set can be clearly distinguished by attackers from
the pass sketches, EvoPass can be easily broken in shoulder-
surfing attacks. PDS is proposed to guide the selection of decoy
sketches. With the help of IRR and PDS, EvoPass can achieve
both practical usability and resistance to shoulder-surfing
attacks.
4.2.1. Information retention ratio (IRR)
IRR is calculated between a sketch and its original image in-
dicating that how many percentage of information is retained
in the sketch after edge detection. IRR is defined as the infor-
mation entropy of a sketch divided by the information entropy
of its original image. In Shannon’s information theory, entropy
is a measurement of the uncertainty associated with a random
variable (Shannon, 2001). Shannon’s function is based on the
concept that the information gain from an event is inversely
related to its probability of occurrence (Pal and Pal, 1991). The
entropy of an image can be defined as a statistical measure
of its characteristics, representing the average amount of in-
formation contained in the image. For example, the one-
dimensional (1D) entropy of an image I based on its one-
dimensional gray level histogram can be calculated as follows
(Kapur et al., 1985; Pun, 1981):
H I p pD i i
i
L
1
0
( ) = − ⋅ ( )
=
∑ log (1)
where L + 1 is the number of gray levels, pi = f(i)/(M × N) is the
frequency of the occurrence f(i) of gray level i, and M × N is the
total number of pixels in image I.
1D entropy is used to characterize the accumulative dis-
tribution of gray levels in image I. However, it does not
characterize the spatial correlation between pixels or the space
distribution of gray levels in an image. Therefore, two images
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which have similar constituent gray levels but different space
distributions would have similar 1D entropy. To make the
entropy further reflect the space distribution of gray levels and
the correlation between pixels, we also use two-dimensional
entropy which is calculated with the surrounding pixels of a
given pixel as another measurement of an image. Abutaleb
(1989) defines two-dimensional entropy of an image I as follows:
H I p pD ij ij
j
L
i
L
2
00
( ) = − ⋅ ( )
==
∑∑ log (2)
where pij = f(i, j)/(M × N) is the frequency of the occurrence f(i, j)
of pixels’ gray level i and their average gray level j; L + 1 is the
total number of gray levels; and M × N is the total number of
pixels in image I.
Similarly, for a color image (i.e., an RGB image), both 1D and
2D entropies can be calculated based on the color histograms
in its red (R), green(G), and blue(B) color channels, respec-
tively, using Eqs. (1) and (2) (Zachary, 2000).
Using 1D entropy and 2D entropy as measurements of an
image, both accumulation and space properties of the image
can be calculated. Hence, IRR based on both one-dimensional
(1D) entropy and two-dimensional (2D) entropy are defined as
follows:
IRR
H F I
H I H I H I
IRR
H F I
H I
D
D
D R D G D B
D
D
D
1
1
1 1 1
2
2
2
=
( )( )
( ) + ( ) + ( )
=
( )( )
,
R D G D BH I H I( ) + ( ) + ( )2 2
(3)
where F(I) represents a sketch generated by processing image
I with an edge detection algorithm, and IR, IG and IB represent
the R, G, B channel image of image I, respectively.
After pass images are uploaded by a user, EvoPass per-
forms edge detection on these images to generate their sketches
and calculates IRR1D and IRR2D for each sketch. Only if both IRR1D
and IRR2D of a sketch fall into an acceptable range, this sketch
is accepted as a pass sketch. Otherwise, the pass image should
be processed in a higher or lower edge detection level until both
IRR1D and IRR2D fall into the acceptable range. Experimental
analysis on the acceptable ranges of IRR1D and IRR2D are given
in Section 5.1.1.
4.2.2. Password diversity score (PDS)
PDS is the variance of distances between each pair of images
in a set of images. Hence, to calculate PDS, we first calculate
the distance between each pair of images. For this purpose, a
gray statistical histogram is introduced for a gray-scale image
p as follows:
Histo g g gp p p pt= ( )1 2, … (4)
where gpi is the total number of pixels in gray level i in the image
p, and t is the total number of gray levels in the image. Since
grayscale images for visual display are commonly stored with
8 bits per sampled pixel, t is set as 256 in our experiment.We
calculate the Euclidean distance of two images p and q:
Dis g gpq pl ql
l
t
= −( )
=
∑ 2
1
(5)
We can thus evaluate the similarity between each pair of
images. The variance of the Euclidean distances indicates the
fluctuation of these distances between images in a challenge
set. A low variance means that the pass images are less con-
spicuous in a challenge set.We calculate PDS using the following
formula:
PDS Var Dis Dis Disxy= ( )12 13, … (6)
where 1 ≤ x, y ≤ k + z and x ≠ y; k and z are the number of pass
images and decoy images, respectively.
Theoretically, PDS can be calculated based on either gray-
scale images or RGB images. The distance between a pair of
images can be calculated based on color histograms in their
R, G, and B color channels using Eq. (5). Consequently, PDS com-
ponents should be calculated in their R, G, and B color channels
using Eq. (6). Finally, PDS value of a set of RGB images is the
mean value of PDS components calculated in R, G, and B color
channels.
After receiving pass images, EvoPass server selects one decoy
image based on PDS from an indeterminate challenge set l′ each
time until all decoy images are selected.To select a decoy image,
the server tests every image in the system database by ten-
tatively adding the image into set l′ and calculating PDS of set
l′. After all images in the system database have been tested,
EvoPass chooses the image that results in the lowest PDS of
set l′ as a decoy image and formally adds this decoy image into
set l′. In this way, EvoPass continually finds the next decoy image
which results in the lowest PDS of set l′ until all decoy images
are identified.
For very large image databases, the computation of image
distances results in poor performance (Zachary, 2000). Accord-
ing to our experimental results, PDS calculated based on gray-
scale images is effective enough for choosing appropriate decoy
sketches. Hence, in our prototype, EvoPass server first trans-
forms pass images received from a client into gray-scale images,
and then calculates PDS only based on gray-scale images, which
provides a substantial improvement in performance over color
images. To further accelerate the computation of PDS, we can
calculate PDS based on binary images (i.e., sketches), which is
introduced in the Appendix.
4.3. Time-evolving feature
An evolved version of a challenge set can be generated by either
processing gray-scale pass images and decoy images in a higher
edge detection level or processing pass sketches and decoy
sketches in the current version with an edge detection algo-
rithm. Fig. 2a shows a sketch generated by processing an image
with Canny algorithm while Canny parameter is set to 0.5.The
other sketches in Fig. 2 are generated by processing the same
image with Canny parameter setting to 0.6 (Fig. 2b) and 0.7
(Fig. 2c). Fig. 3a is the same sketch as Fig. 2a. Fig. 3b is gener-
ated by processing the sketch in Fig. 3a with Canny algorithm
using Canny parameter 0.1, while Fig. 3c is generated by per-
forming Canny algorithm on Fig. 3b with Canny parameter set
to 0.1.We observe that performing edge detection on a sketch
highlights the edges in the evolved sketch (Fig. 3b and Fig. 3c),
while processing the original image in a higher edge detec-
tion level makes the evolved sketch (Fig. 2b and Fig. 2c) more
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difficult to recognize.Therefore, we suggest to generate evolved
versions of a challenge set by processing gray-scale pass images
and decoy images with an edge detection algorithm in a high
edge detection level.
4.4. Roll-back mechanism
EvoPass supports two different roll-back mechanisms and both
of these mechanisms can prevent roll-back operations acti-
vated by a shoulder-surfing attacker. Fig. 4 illustrates these two
mechanisms, in which each node represents a version of the
challenge set. For each hollow arrow in Fig. 4, the end node
represents the next evolved version of the version repre-
sented by the start node.
As indicated by the dotted line in Fig. 4, EvoPass supports
roll back to previously used versions of the challenge set. In
this way, if a user activates roll-back operations while the N-th
version of the challenge set is in use, the N − 1-th version of
challenge set should be used for challenging the user as the
result of roll-back operations. In this case, EvoPass validates
the initiator of roll-back operations with other authentication
mechanisms, such as PIN-based user authentication. Alterna-
tively, users can also active the roll-back operations by
answering some security questions which are widely used to
authenticate users who have forgotten their passwords in the
current authentication systems. In this case, users do not need
to memorize additional PIN codes. Since the roll-back process
is needed by chance, we suggest users to activate this roll-
back operations in a security environment which could mitigate
the risk of shoulder-surfing attacks in this process.
EvoPass also supports roll back to a new version of the chal-
lenge set which is composed of pass sketches and decoy
sketches different from those previously used.This method is
represented by the solid line in Fig. 4. In this way, once a user
activates roll-back operations while the N-th version of the chal-
lenge set is in use, EvoPass first checks the parameters of the
N − 1-th version including the edge detection algorithm used
for generating theN − 1-th version and related parameters.Then
EvoPass further checks the edge detection algorithm used for
generating the N − 2-th version and related parameters. After
that, EvoPass processes pass sketches and decoy sketches in
the N − 2-th version with an edge detection algorithm that is
different from the one used for generating the N − 1-th version,
and thus generates the N − 1′-th version as the result of roll-
back. In this case, the pass sketches in the N − 1-th version are
different from the previously used pass sketches, which in-
creases the difficulty for shoulder-surfing attackers to identify
pass sketches even they have already obtained some infor-
mation about the previous versions.Therefore, authenticating
the roll-back initiator is not required for this solution. However,
this solution consumes more storage space for keeping the pa-
rameters of previous versions, indicating the edge detection
algorithms used for generating previous versions and corre-
sponding function parameters.
Fig. 2 – Sketches generated by processing an image with an edge detection algorithm in different edge detection levels.
Fig. 3 – Sketches generated by processing the previous sketch with an edge detection algorithm.
Fig. 4 – Roll-back mechanisms.
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4.5. Space of evolved passwords
For one password (constructed by pass sketches) registered by
a user, EvoPass gradually generates evolved versions of this
password as time goes by. However, the information con-
tained in a pass sketch will eventually become too little for a
legitimate user to recognize after multiple evolving operations.
Therefore, the number of evolved versions of a given pass-
word is limited. For a given password, if EvoPass processes pass
sketches with only one specific edge detection algorithm and
a user can no longer identify his/her pass sketches since the
N + 1-th version of challenge set, the user can recognize the
1st version of pass sketches to the N-th version. Hence, in this
case, the number of usable evolved passwords (i.e. the pass-
words of the 1st version to the N-th version) is N.
A promising way to expand the space of evolved pass-
words is to process pass sketches (as well as the decoy sketches)
with more than one edge detection algorithm. In this way, the
space of evolved passwords is expanded to a tree structure, as
shown in Fig. 5 in which each node represents one evolved
version of the given password,M represents the number of edge
detection algorithms, and N represents the number of recog-
nizable evolved passwords when pass sketches are processed
by only one edge extraction algorithm.Through processing pass
sketches withM different edge detection algorithms, the number
of evolved passwords greatly increases to (1 − MN)/(1 − M)
from N. Moreover, besides being processed by edge detection al-
gorithms, pass sketches and decoy sketches can also be
processed in other methods to reduce recognizable informa-
tion contained in a sketch (e.g., adding randomnoise in a sketch).
Fig. 6 provides a comparison on processing images with two
different edge detection algorithms – Canny and Roberts. The
Fig. 5 – Space of evolved password.
Fig. 6 – Sketches generated by processing an image with different algorithms.
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sketches shown in Fig. 6b are generated by processing the origi-
nal images with Canny algorithm and the Canny parameter
is set to 0.5.We also process the original images using Roberts
algorithm with the Roberts parameter set to 0.15, and the gen-
erated sketches are shown in Fig. 6c. It can be observed that,
for a given original image, the corresponding sketch in Fig. 6b
contains different edge information from that in Fig. 6c. More
particularly, some sketches generated by processing the origi-
nal images with Canny algorithm contain more information
than those generated by processing Roberts algorithm on the
original images, while other sketches generated by process-
ing the original images with Canny algorithm contain less
information than those generated by processing the original
images with Roberts algorithm.The metrics, including IRR and
PDS, and the respective acceptable ranges (which are given in
Section 5.1) can also be used to evaluate the sketches gener-
ated by processing the images with Roberts algorithm. To
broaden the pass sketch space of EvoPass using different edge
detection algorithms, both IRR and PDS of the generated
sketches should fall into the known acceptable ranges. It can
be achieved by applying appropriate parameters in respec-
tive edge detection algorithm.
5. Security analysis
In this section, we first analyze the security of our system based
on the values of IRR and PDS and give some suggestions on
choosing these values according to our experimental results.
We then evaluate the resistance of EvoPass to shoulder-
surfing attacks. Finally, we analyze other attacks to EvoPass,
including smudge attacks, exhaustive attacks, dictionary attacks,
image-harvest attacks and social engineering attacks.
5.1. Trade-off between security and usability
The values of IRR and PDS should be decided based on the trade-
off between security and usability. For IRR, a relatively high value
means that more information of an image remains in its sketch,
which also means that it is relatively easy for both legitimate
user and shoulder-surfing attacker to recognize pass sketches.
For PDS, a high value would make pass sketches conspicuous
in a challenge set, which also means that that is relatively easy
for both legitimate users and shoulder-surfing attackers to rec-
ognize pass sketches. Since users are familiar with their pass
images (which are chosen from their private images) and also
their pass sketches (through user training and continuous au-
thentication practices), they require much less recognizable
information than shoulder-surfing attackers to identify pass
sketches. The values of IRR and PDS should be selected so as
to make it as difficult as possible for shoulder-surfing attack-
ers to identify pass sketches, while ensuring that users can
still recognize pass sketches. We carry out a series of experi-
ments to explore how to choose IRR and PDS values appropriately.
5.1.1. Information retention ratio
We invited 103 participants to help determine the appropri-
ate range of IRR in our experiments.We gave each participant
one identical test image and asked him/her to identify its sketch
from a challenge set. This set is composed of the test sketch
transformed from the test image and the 8 decoy sketches
transformed from 8 different decoy images. For each chal-
lenge set, the test image and decoy images are processed by
Canny algorithm with the same Canny parameter. For one test
image, we processed the test image and decoy images using
Canny parameter from 0.9 to 0.1 with a decrement of 0.05 in
each step for generating different challenge sets. Each partici-
pant was asked to identify the test sketch from these challenge
sets. We challenged each participant with 20 different test
images.
According to our experimental result, 98.6 percent of test
sketches generated with Canny parameter 0.35 can be recog-
nized by the participants, while 98.1 percent of test sketches
generated with Canny parameter 0.4 can be recognized by par-
ticipants.A pass sketch should still contain enough information
for a legitimate user to recognize it. Considering that the per-
centage of sketches that can be recognized by participants
decreases while the Canny parameter increases, we decide that
the lower threshold of IRR should ensure that more than 98
percent of sketches generated with this threshold can be rec-
ognized by participants. However, to increase the difficulty for
a shoulder-surfing attacker to identify users’ pass sketches, the
information contained in pass sketches should be as less as
possible. Hence, we set the lower threshold of IRR as 0.4. 97.3
percent of test sketches generated with Canny parameter
(0.4–0.55) can be easily identified by participants while only 42.6
percent of test sketches generated with Canny parameter 0.6
can be recognized. Hence,we use the range of average IRR values
corresponding to Canny parameter (0.4–0.55) as the accept-
able range of IRR while generating pass sketches.
Then, we calculated the average values of IRR1D and IRR2D
corresponding to each Canny parameter (0.9–0.1) from ten thou-
sand images in Matlab. 20 test images and corresponding decoy
images used in our experiment were also chosen from these
ten thousand images.The relationship between IRR1D and Canny
parameter is shown in Fig. 7, and that between IRR2D and Canny
parameter is shown in Fig. 8. The acceptable range of IRR1D
0.773%–1.26% corresponds to Canny parameter (0.4–0.55); and
Fig. 7 – The relationship between IRR1D value and Canny
parameter.
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the acceptable range of IRR2D 5.45%–8.05% corresponds to Canny
parameter (0.4–0.55).
After pass images are uploaded by a user, we suggest to gen-
erate pass sketches by processing pass images with default edge
detection function parameters (at Canny parameter 0.55)
and calculate IRR1D and IRR2D for each pass sketch. If IRR1D
of a pass sketch falls into 0.773%–1.26% and IRR2D falls into
5.45%–8.05%, this pass sketch is accepted. Otherwise, the pass
image is processed in a higher or lower edge detection level
until both IRR1D and IRR2D fall into the acceptable range.
5.1.2. Password diversity score
Using PDS in challenge set generation, the difficulty of recog-
nizing pass sketches can be quantified. To investigate the
influence of PDS on the choice of decoy sketches, we compare
a challenge set generated based on the highest PDS value with
a challenge set generated based on the lowest PDS value. All
decoy images are chosen from the same ten thousand images
in our experiments.
Fig. 9 shows two challenge sets given the same pass images.
Fig. 9a shows the challenge set generated using the highest
PDS value, while Fig. 9b is the challenge set generated using
the lowest PDS value. In Fig. 9a, some sketches contain clear
outlines, while others contain large-area background and few
outlines. In this situation, attackers may choose the sketches
with clear outlines as pass sketches. In contrast, in Fig. 9b, there
is no such difference among the sketches. Choosing images
with relatively low PDS reduces the risk of exposing pass
sketches in a challenge set.
A relatively low PDS value of a challenge set also means that
pass sketches are concealed better in the challenge set, which
raises the bar for a shoulder-surfing attacker to recognize pass
sketches. However, it may also raise the difficulty for a user
to identify pass sketches.To help a user recognize pass sketches
in a challenge set generated based on the lowest value of PDS,
EvoPass provides a user training phase to overcome the diffi-
culty in identifying pass sketches. More details on generating
the challenge set based on PDS are given in Section 6.
5.2. Resistance to shoulder-surfing attacks
A shoulder-surfing attack can be explained as password entry
being observed by an attacker at the real-time, and replayed
at a later time. To quantify the impact of shoulder-surfing
attacks on EvoPass,we invited 20 participants to act as shoulder-
surfing attackers observing password entry in EvoPass. Every
participant stands behind a user; the accurate position is
decided by the participant to ensure that he/she has a clear
view to observe the user’s authentication actions.We compare
the resistance to shoulder-surfing attacks between EvoPass and
two popular graphical password schemes – Awase-e (Takada
et al., 2006) and UseYour Illusion (Hayashi et al., 2008). Awase-e
is a graphic password system without image distortion fea-
tures, while Use Your Illusion is a distortion-based graphic
mechanism in which the recognizable information is reduced
in a challenge set. We implement EvoPass and these two
systems in Matlab.
The participants in our experiment are asked to observe the
same user entering passwords in all three systems. Each system
supports 3 different sizes of challenge set, which are 6-image,
Fig. 8 – The relationship between IRR2D value and Canny
parameter.
Fig. 9 – Challenge sets generated with different requirements on PDS value.
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10-image and 14-image. In each system, a participant ob-
serves the user entering 10 different passwords in challenge
sets of each size. For each password, after observing the user
choosing pass images (i.e. pass sketches in EvoPass) in a login
phase, the participant has one chance to authenticate himself/
herself. If the participant can identify all pass images (i.e. pass
sketches in EvoPass) that he/she has previously observed, the
attack is successful, otherwise unsuccessful. The processes of
observing password entry and performing the attack are re-
peated until the participant can successfully identify all pass
sketches in a single attack.
In our experiments, the pass images that are supplied by a
user are processed with the Canny algorithm in Matlab so as
to generate pass sketches in EvoPass. Each sketch is generated
with the default Canny parameter 0.55; a decrement of 0.05 is
applied in the next try until IRR1D falls into 0.773%–1.26% and
IRR2D falls into 5.45%–8.05%, which are chosen according to the
experimental results in Section 5.1.1. After that, decoy images
are chosen from 1000 system images based on the lowest PDS,
and then decoy sketches are generated with Canny algorithm
in the same way as pass sketches. Finally, all pass sketches and
decoy sketches are presented in the size of 100 (pixels) × 100
(pixels); the pass images and decoy images of Awase-e and Use
Your Illusion are presented in the same format, which is rea-
sonable for mobile devices.To evaluate the improvement on the
resistance to shoulder-surfing attacks, we further process
each pass image and decoy image with the Canny parameter
set to 0.05 higher than the one used for generating the first
version of sketch. In Figs. 10–15, this case is labeled as
EvoPass − evolved.
The participants are asked to estimate their memory ac-
curacy ranging from 100% to 50%.The number of participants
for each level of self-estimated memory accuracy are given in
Table 2. Figs. 10 and 11 report the numbers of observations re-
quired by an attacker to learn only one pass sketch and all pass
sketches, respectively. Figs. 12–14 provide more accurate sta-
tistical results on the number of observations required by an
attacker to learn all pass sketches in each test systemwith error
bars displayed. For the label “K:a − b” in these figures, “a” in-
dicates the total number of images (i.e. sketches in EvoPass)
in the challenge set; “b” indicates the number of pass images
(i.e. pass sketches in EvoPass) required for one successful login,
which is set to 4 in our experiments.
From Figs. 10–14, we have the following observations:
(1) Given any size of the challenge set in each system, the at-
tackers who are more confident with their memory accuracy
need less observations to learn either one pass image/sketch
or all pass images/sketches. (2) Given any memory accuracy
of attacker’s perception in each system, when the number of
Table 2 – Number of participants for each level of self-
estimated memory accuracy.
Self-estimated
memory accuracy
100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50%
Number of participants 1 2 3 5 6 3
Fig. 10 – Number of observations required by an attacker to
learn one pass sketch.
Fig. 11 – Number of observations required by an attacker to
learn all pass sketches.
Fig. 12 – Number of observations required by an attacker to
learn all pass sketches in a 6-image challenge set.
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decoy images increases, the attackers need more observa-
tions to learn either one pass image/sketch or all pass images/
sketches.
(3) Given any memory accuracy of attacker’s perception, the
distortion-based graphical password systems, including Hayashi
et al. (2008) and EvoPass, require more observations than the
distortion-free graphical password system (Takada et al., 2006)
for an attacker to learn either one pass image/sketch or all pass
images/sketches. (4) After evolving pass sketches and decoy
sketches, the attackers, who estimate their memory accuracy
to be less than 60%, need more observations to learn 1 pass
sketch in a 6-image challenge set in EvoPass than in a 10-
image challenge set in Takada et al. (2006) and Hayashi et al.
(2008). (5) For the attackers who estimate their memory accu-
racy to be less than 60%, the observations to learn all 4 pass
sketches in an evolved 6-image challenge set in EvoPass is close
to those in a 10-image challenge set in Takada et al. (2006).
The success attack rates after different numbers of obser-
vations are recorded in Figs. 15–17. Once an attacker identifies
all 4 pass images (i.e., pass sketches in EvoPass), which happens
after observing a user’s password entry k times, we call this
attack a successful attack after k observations. In each system, for
a given size of challenge set, the success attack rate after k ob-
servations is the total number of successful attacks after k
observations divided by the total number of successful attacks.
The total number of successful attacks is 200, which is also the
total number of passwords that has been attacked. This is
because, in our experiments, an attacker is allowed to repeat-
edly observe and attack until he/she can successfully identify
all pass images (i.e. pass sketches in EvoPass).
From Figs. 15–17, we have the following two observations
which further demonstrate that the time-evolving feature sig-
nificantly improves the resistance to shoulder-surfing attacks:
(1) In EvoPass, given any 6-image challenge set, all successful
attacks require no more than 9 observations when the chal-
lenge sets have not been evolved; however, after evolving the
challenge sets, 53.5% successful attacks require no less than
9 observations. Hence, the time-evolving feature improves the
resistance to shoulder-surfing attacks without increasing
the number of decoy sketches. (2) Given any evolved 6-image
challenge set in EvoPass or any 10-image challenge set in
Takada et al. (2006), over 50% successful attacks require no less
than 9 observations (53.5% in EvoPass 77% in Takada et al.
(2006)). Compared to Takada et al. (2006), it is not difficult for
Fig. 13 – Number of observations required by an attacker to
learn all pass sketches in a 10-image challenge set.
Fig. 14 – Number of observations required by an attacker to
learn all pass sketches in a 14-image challenge set.
Fig. 15 – Success attack rates after different numbers of
observations against a 6-image challenge set.
Fig. 16 – Success attack rates after different numbers of
observations against a 10-image challenge set.
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EvoPass to achieve the same or even stronger resistance to
shoulder-surfing attacks with less decoy images by further
evolving the evolved version of challenge set.
5.3. Resistance to other attacks
Besides the resistance to shoulder-surfing attacks, EvoPass also
take countermeasures to the following known attacks and a
new attack, which is named as image-harvest attack by us.
5.3.1. Exhaustive attack
This attack happens when an attacker selects images at random
until all pass sketches are obtained. Assuming that an EvoPass
application contains P pass sketches and Q decoy sketches, a
random attacker attempting choose a user’s pass sketches in
the challenge set would get this right with the probability of
P
P Q
P
P Q
P P
P Q P+
×
−
+ −
× ×
− −( )
+ − −( )
1
1
1
1
… . For a random 4-digit PIN
which is widely used in current mobile authentication systems,
the probability that an attacker can successfully guess a user’s
PIN is 1/1000. Hence, if an EvoPass implementation requires
a user to select 3 pass sketches from an 18-image challenge
set, the probability that the attacker can successfully choose
a user’s all 3 pass sketches is 1/816 which is close to the prob-
ability in 4-digit PIN-based authentication systems. In this case,
an 18-image challenge set can be displayed on 2 pages; and
each page contains 9 images which is a reasonable size for most
mobile devices. Moreover, to mitigate the risk of exhaustive
attacks, EvoPass supports a lock out policy which blocks a user
after several continuous failed authentication attempts.
5.3.2. Dictionary attack
In a textual password system, users tend to select simple pass-
words following some regular patterns, which are vulnerable
to dictionary attacks. However, in EvoPass, users select pass
images differently and unpredictably. Moreover, unlike previ-
ous graphical password systems in which all pass sketches are
selected from system images, a user of EvoPass selects pass
images from his/her private images, which further increases
the difficulty of mounting dictionary attacks.
5.3.3. Social engineering attack
Some attackers who know a user very well may recognize or
guess the user’s private images among several other images.
However, EvoPass uses sketches to challenge users rather than
original images.The edge information in a sketch only reveals
partial content of an original image, which increases the dif-
ficulty for such attacker to identify the user’s pass sketch.
5.3.4. Smudge attack
EvoPass presents pass sketches and decoy sketches on the user
interface in a random sequence. Therefore, the oily residues
on the screen does not carry any information or pattern about
pass sketches.
5.3.5. Images-harvest attack
Images-harvest attack is a new attack to graphic password
systems, which has not been considered before. If decoy images
are generated from a dedicated system image database as in
most previous graphical password systems, an attacker may
register many accounts and/or frequently change pass images
so as to get a large number of challenge sets and collect plenty
of decoy images. Assuming that a system image database con-
tains M images, and a challenge set contains d decoy images
and s pass images.Thus, an images-harvest attacker can collect
d decoy images from a challenge set. Through uploading pass
images L/d times, the attacker can get L/d challenge sets and
collect L decoy images if decoy images contained in a new chal-
lenge set are all different from the previous decoy images.
Normally, the attacker needs more than L/d challenge sets to
collect all L decoy images since some decoy images might be
repeatedly displayed in several challenge sets. When the at-
tacker tries to login to a target account after collecting L decoy
images, the probability that he/she can recognize all decoy
images is
P
L
M
L
M
L d
M d
= ×
−
−
× ×
− −( )
− −( )
1
1
1
1
… (7)
Hence, an attacker who has collected all M images in the
system database can even recognize all decoy images in a target
account’s challenge set, and then identify all pass images with
100 percent accuracy.
To keep EvoPass resilient to images-harvest attacks, the da-
tabase used for choosing the decoy sketches in EvoPass is
constructed by all users’ pass images rather than system
images. In this way, even if an attacker has collected all decoy
sketches from a challenge set, he/she still cannot identify a
target account’s pass sketches by excluding all decoy sketches
since both the target account’s pass sketches and decoy
sketches are contained in his/her collection of decoy sketches.
Thus, only if a decoy sketch in the target account’s challenge
set is generated from a pass image uploaded by the attacker,
the attacker can identify it as a decoy sketch. Still assuming
that a system image database contains M images, and a chal-
lenge set contains d decoy sketches and s pass sketches. After
uploading pass sketches L/d times, an attacker can only collect
L′ = (L/d) × s sketches which would be used as other users’ decoy
sketches, provided that the decoy images contained in a new
challenge set are different from the previous decoy images.Then
Fig. 17 – Success attack rates after different numbers of
observations against a 14-image challenge set.
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the system image database would contain M′ = M + (L/d) × s
images. The probability that such attacker can recognize all
decoy images in a target account’s challenge set is
′ =
′
′
×
′ −
′ −
× ×
′ − −( )
′ − −( )P
L
M
L
M
L d
M d
1
1
1
1
… (8)
Once a challenge set contains more decoy sketches than
pass sketches, s < d. Then, L′ = (L/d) × s < L. Because L′ < L, and
also becauseM′ = M + (L/d) > M, we have P′ < P. Hence, after up-
loading pass images L/d times, the probability that an attacker
can recognize all decoy images in a target account’s chal-
lenge set in EvoPass is usually much smaller than in other
graphical systems that use system images as decoy images.
For example, when a system image database contains 1000
images, and a challenge set contains 6 decoy images/sketches
and 3 pass images/sketches, after uploading pass images 100
times, P = 4.61% and P′ = 0.0145%. More importantly, unlike in
these other systems, the attacker can never ensure himself to
recognize all decoy sketches in EvoPass by frequently upload-
ing pass sketches, since these M sketches which are already
contained in the database still might be used as the target ac-
count’s decoy sketches.
5.3.6. Technology-based recording attack
EvoPass improves the resistance to technology-based record-
ing attacks.There are two types of technology-based recording
attackers.The technology-based recording attacker without the
capability of image process is a weak adversary. After record-
ing legitimate users’ selection of pass sketches with automatic
recording devices, such as hidden cameras or video cameras,
such attackers can remember the pass sketches through re-
peatedly observing the records. However, such attackers may
face an evolved version of challenge set when they try to pass
authentication with recorded pass sketches. Since such at-
tackers have no knowledge of original pass images, it is
relatively difficult for them to recognize the evolved pass
sketches. On the other hand, the technology-based recording
attacker is a strong adversary who can process the recorded
pass sketches with image process algorithms, including edge
detection algorithms. Since the edge detection functions used
in EvoPass are analogous to one-way functions used in cryp-
tography, the attacker cannot recover the pass images using
recoded pass sketches. Meanwhile, as we elaborated in Section
4.3, processing the current pass sketches with an edge detec-
tion algorithmmay not always yield an evolved version of pass
sketches.
6. Implementation and evaluation
In this section, we implement EvoPass as a screen unlock ap-
plication on an Android 4.2.2 smartphone. Furthermore, we
evaluate the usability and efficiency of our prototype.
6.1. Implementation on Android platform
We implement a prototype of EvoPass on an Android 4.2.2
smartphone. For the purpose of running the whole system
correctly, we also build a web server using Apache TOMCAT
and an FTP server using Serv-u. Considering the limited size
of the screen, in our prototype, a challenge set is displayed as
a 3 × 3 matrix, including three pass sketches and six decoy
sketches. Each sketch in a challenge set is displayed in 100
(pixels) × 100 (pixels).
6.1.1. Registration
In our prototype, once the server receives a registration request
and pass images, it chooses decoy sketches to generate a chal-
lenge set. In our prototype, we choose decoy skecthes from 1000
randomly chosen images in the database. According to our ex-
perimental results, it takes an average of 20.3 s to choose decoy
images among 1000 randomly chosen images in the data-
base based on PDS.
After all decoy images are identified, we use OPENCV Canny
function to process pass images and decoy images with the
default edge detection threshold set to [180,450]. We perform
OPENCV Canny function on 1000 images with different thresh-
olds to determine an appropriate default edge detection
threshold. Finally,we set the default threshold as [180,450] which
results in the average value of IRR1D of those 1000 sketches being
0.811% and the average value of IRR2D being 6.26%. According
to our evaluations in Section 5.1.1, both values are accept-
able. To keep pass sketches recognizable to a legitimate user,
we calculate IRR1D and IRR2D of each pass sketch. Only if both
IRR1D and IRR2D of a pass sketch fall into the selected range as
given in Section 5.1.1, this pass sketch is accepted. Other-
wise, we reprocess the pass images by increasing 10% of both
high threshold and low threshold, until both IRR1D and IRR2D
fall into the range.
6.1.2. Evolving password
In our prototype, we evolve the sketches in the challenge set
by processing pass images and decoy images in a higher edge
detection level to reduce the information contained in the
sketches. Our prototype supports automatically evolving
and the default evolving period is set to two weeks.The Canny
edge detection threshold increases 2 percent each time to gen-
erate an evolved version of the challenge set. However, the
default increment of threshold can be configured to a differ-
ent value in other implementation based on different security
requirements.
We set this default increment of threshold based on a heu-
ristic view on the influences of different threshold increments.
100 participants are invited to identify evolved pass sketches
generated with different edge detection thresholds.We divide
100 participants into 4 groups evenly. Participants in Group I,
Group II, Group III and Group IV deal with evolved versions of
challenge set generated by setting the default increment of
threshold to 1%, 2%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Every partici-
pant chooses 3 pass sketches from his/her private images and
tries twenty evolved versions of password.We record the success
rate for each authentication period in Table 3.We observe that
most participants are still satisfied with the 15th evolved version
when the default variation of threshold is set to 2%.
6.1.3. Roll-back
Our prototype supports roll back to a new version of the
challenge set, rather than to previous versions of the challenge
192 c om pu t e r s & s e cu r i t y 7 0 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1 7 9 – 1 9 8
set (which is introduced in Section 4.4). First, EvoPass checks
the parameters of the current version of the challenge set
and two latest versions as illustrated in Section 4.4. Then,
the client processes the first version of pass sketches and
decoy sketches with OPENCV Canny function using the same
threshold used for generating the third from the end version
of the challenge set.After that, it further processes the sketches
with OPENCV Roberts function, an edge detection function,
generating a new version of the challenge set. Note that,
although we used Roberts algorithm in our prototype, other
edge detection algorithms may be used in other EvoPass
implementations.
An instance of roll-back operations in our prototype is shown
in Fig. 18. Fig. 18a illustrates a new version of challenge set re-
sulting from a roll-back request, and Fig. 18b is the current
version of the challenge set when the user asks for roll-back.
Fig. 18c shows the latest version of the challenge set before
Fig. 18b. It is observed that the pass sketches and decoy sketches
in Fig. 18a and Fig. 18c are graphically different, while either
Fig. 18a or Fig. 18c contains more recognizable information than
Fig. 18b.
6.2. Usability and efficiency
In order to evaluate the usability and efficiency of EvoPass with
the default threshold increment set to 2%, we design a set of
experiments and invite 103 participants in our experiments.
Participants are required to install EvoPass client on their mobile
phones, register their pass images at the first day, and pass the
authentications in five periods during two weeks. In the fourth
(one week later) and fifth period (two weeks later), after E-mail
invitation, 98 and 93 participants respectively returned to our
experiments.
We divide all the participants into three groups evenly.
The participants in the first group are authenticated without
time-evolving feature. Other two groups experience time-
evolving feature with different evolving intervals. Group “with
time-evolving I” reduces the recognizable information every
two days. Group “with time-evolving II” reduces the recogniz-
able information every day.We ask each participant to try on
authentication every 6 minutes within one hour in each period.
We allow participants when challenged with evolved ver-
sions of the challenge set to activate the roll-back operations.
According to the experimental results shown in Table 4, par-
ticipants in all three groups pass authentication in a high
rate. Moreover, the success rate with time-evolving feature is
close to that without time-evolving feature.
We record the login time for all successful authentica-
tions within three attempts. The login time is measured
cumulatively, which means that the clock is not reset after a
failed login attempt but runs until the user successfully logs
in, or fails in three consecutive times. The average login time
Table 3 – Success rate for each authentication period
(the number of participants whose first request to
increase the edge detection threshold/decrease the edge
detection threshold appears in relative interval of
attempts).
Group I Group II Group III With
time-evolving II
[1st, 5th] 12/0 0/0 0/0 0/11
[6th, 10th] 5/0 8/0 2/13 2/5
[11th, 15th] 0/4 3/2 1/4 0/2
[16th, 20th] 0/9 0/9 0/3 0/2
(b) (c)(a)
Fig. 18 – An instance of roll-back.
Table 4 – Success rate for each authentication period
(the number of successful authentications through 1
attempt/2 attempts/3 attempts/roll-back once/total
number of authentications).
Without
time-evolving
With
time-evolving
I
With
time-evolving
II
1st day 317/18/5/–/340 320/19/1/0/340 313/25/2/0/340
2nd day 324/14/2/–/340 322/18/0/0/340 327/12/0/0/340
3rd day 324/15/1/–/340 316/23/1/0/340 326/20/3/1/340
1 week later 285/23/2/–/310 263/59/8/1/330 291/40/7/2/340
2 weeks later 256/29/5/–/290 290/39/9/2/340 247/45/6/1/300
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is 4.1 seconds, which is significantly faster than the average
login time in Use Your Illusion (Hayashi et al., 2008) (which is
over 10 seconds). This is because a user of Use Your Illusion
is required to select three pass images out of a set of 27 images.
These images are displayed on 3 pages, so that a user needs
to switch back and forth between these pages several times
to identify his/her pass images. In comparison, a 9-image chal-
lenge set in our prototype is displayed on a single page. To
enhance the security of EvoPass against exhaustive attacks,
users may be required to choose 3 pass sketches in a set of
18 or more images. These images would also be display on 2
or more pages, which will increase the login time accord-
ingly. Since the average login time for choosing 3 pass sketches
in a 9-image challenge set displayed on one page is only 4.1
seconds, the login time for choosing 3 pass sketches in an
18-image challenge set displayed on two pages should also be
acceptable.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an evolvable graphical password
system named EvoPass. EvoPass is resilient to shoulder-
surfing attacks without requiring users to change their pass
images. To achieve both desirable usability and resistance to
shoulder-surfing attacks, we apply two metrics – IRR and PDS
in generating a challenge set. Our experimental results show
that, using edge detection as the image distortion feature in
EvoPass improves its resistance to shoulder-surfing attacks com-
pared to other graphical password systems without the image
distortion feature. Furthermore, with the help of IRR and PDS,
more observations of password entry are needed for a shoulder-
surfing attacker to break a target account in EvoPass than in
another graphical system featuring image distortion (Hayashi
et al., 2008). Particularly, with the time-evolving feature, EvoPass
can achieve the same resistance to shoulder-surfing attacks
with less decoy images than other graphical systems.We further
explore the usability and efficiency of EvoPass through imple-
menting a prototype of EvoPass on Android 4.2.2 platform.The
experimental results on our prototype demonstrate that users
are skilled to use EvoPass with acceptable login time and a
desired success login rate even after evolving their challenge
sets.
Acknowledgment
This work was supported by the Singapore National Re-
search Foundation under NCR Award Number NRF2014NCR-
NCR001-012. We thank the associate editor and the two
reviewers whose insightful comments and suggestions helped
improve and clarify this manuscript.
Appendix A. Calculation of PDS based on binary
images
To decrease the computational overhead caused by PDS cal-
culation, one may calculate PDS based on binary images (i.e.,
sketches). PDSs is the variance of distances between each pair
of sketches in a set of sketches.While calculating PDSs, the dis-
tance between two sketches is calculated based on the
proportion of the pixel value 255 in a sketch. A sketch is evenly
divided into N × N parts and the proportion of the pixel value
255 is calculated in each part. After that we build an N × N-
dimensional coordinate system, in which the proportion of the
pixel value 255 in each part represents the coordinate in one
dimensional space correspondingly. In this way, we map a
sketch into this N × N-dimensional coordinate system. Fig. A19
shows the way to map a sketch 1 into a 9-dimensional coor-
dinate system, where mi is the number of the pixel value 255
in part i, and ni is the size of part i.
After mapping sketches into the N × N-dimensional coor-
dinate system, the distance of image p and q is calculated by
Dis x xpq pi qi
i
N N
= −( )
=
×
∑ 2
1
(A.1)
Then PDSs is calculated as
PDS Var Dis Dis Diss xy= ( )12 13, … (A.2)
where 1 ≤ x, y ≤ k + z and x ≠ y; k and z are the number of pass
sketches and decoy sketches, respectively.
Fig. A20 shows two challenge sets generated based on dif-
ferent PDSs values in Matlab. The decoy sketches of these two
challenge sets are chosen from the same ten thousand images
used for generating the challenge sets in Fig. 9. Fig. A20a shows
a challenge set generated based on the highest PDSs value, while
Fig. A19 – Mapping a sketch to a 9-dimensional system.
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Fig. A20b shows a challenge set generated based on the lowest
PDSs value. In Fig. A20b, there is no obvious difference among
the sketches.
Hence, EvoPass can also choose decoy sketches based on
PDSs. In this way, when the server receives pass images from
a client, it first processes each pass image with edge detec-
tion algorithm and calculates IRR1D and IRR2D of each pass sketch
to ensure that enough recognizable information remains in the
pass sketch. After that, the server processes all images in the
database (or a set of images if appropriate) to sketches and
chooses sketches that result in smallest value of PDSs as decoy
sketches.We also implement the selection of decoy sketches
using PDSs in our prototype. After transferring 3 pass images
to pass sketches, the average time to choose 6 decoy images
among 1000 randomly chosen images in the database based
on PDSs is 235 ms, while the average time is 20.3 s using PDS
calculated based on gray-scale images.
The computational complexity of PDSs is O((N × N)2), while
the computational complexity of PDSg (which is calculated using
Eqs. (5) and (6) based on gray-scale images) is O(t2), where t is
the number of all pixels in an image.Therefore, choosing decoy
images based on PDSs results in a higher efficiency compared
to PDSg. While calculating PDSs, the smaller the value of N is
assigned, the higher the efficiency is achieved. However, less
characteristics are used in calculating the distance between
a pair of images with a smaller N. As a result, PDSs is calcu-
lated based on less characteristics whichmay reduce the quality
of a challenge set.
Fig. A20 – Challenge sets generated with different requirements on PDSs value.
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Appendix B. An example on evolved versions of a challenge set
Fig. B21 shows every 4th over 20 generations of a challenge set with the default variation threshold set to 2%. Fig. B21a is the
first version of the challenge set, and the subsequent subfigures are the evolved challenge sets after every 4 rounds of pass-
word evolving.
Appendix. Supplementary material
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at doi:10.1016/j.cose.2017.05.006.
Fig. B21 – Every 4th of 20 generations of evolved sketches.
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